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Abstract: We are grateful to John Jost for carefully engaging with our work and 
presenting a different interpretation of our findings on the effects of fear and anger stemming 
from the November 13 Paris attacks on the propensity to vote for the far right (Jost, 2019). Jost 
advances a model that holds that anger mediates the effect of fear on support for the far right. In 
this rejoinder we respond to the issues he raises regarding our model specification, consider his 
alternative suggestion, and offer some conclusions about how to resolve this debate empirically. 
We hope this exchange advances the literature on the impact of various societal threats on voting 
for the far right.  
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The recent surge in popularity of authoritarian leaders and parties across a number of 
countries poses a fundamental challenge to civil rights, liberties, and international cooperation. 
The trend has spurred widespread debate in the social sciences about the psychological 
mechanisms that lead citizens to endorse such risky and potentially anti-democratic politics. In 
the field of political psychology, a large stream of research has argued that the experience of 
negative emotions- especially fear- as a result of real or perceived threats are the main culprit 
(Jost et al., 2017). 
In our article, (Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino, & Foucault, 2019) we attempted to 
explore the affective substrates of support for the far right. We used the occasion of the deadly 
November 13, 2015 Paris attacks to investigate the distinct impact of popular fear versus anger 
on the propensity to vote for the far right Front National (FN) in the 2015 French Regional 
elections that took place three weeks after the events. Our results showed that anger boosted, 
while fear weakened the propensity to vote for the far right. Further, we found that anger 
augmented the role of authoritarianism and rightwing political orientations on voting for the far 
right, while fear inhibited this same relationship. We hope that disentangling the effects of fear 
and anger on support for far right parties offers a fuller account of the psychological motivations 
behind the rise of the far right around the world.
We are pleased that John Jost, a valued colleague with a very important contribution in 
the field of political psychology, has taken an interest in our work and offered an alternative 
interpretation of our findings (Jost, 2019). Jost’s interpretation rests on two arguments. First, he 
shows results that suggest that when anger is omitted from the analysis, fear is positively 
associated with voting for the FN. We reported that same result in an attempt to highlight the 
need to include measures of both fear and anger when investigating the emotional substrates of 
far right voters. Jost argues that the proper causal model is one in which fear precedes and 
therefore causes anger, and anger then boosts support for the far right. To test his hypothesis, he 
presents a path analysis where anger and authoritarianism simultaneously mediate the effect of 
fear on vote choice. This causal model produces path estimates that are plausible, but, as we 
elaborate below, we think our own causal interpretation is more likely.
Even though we disagree with some of Jost’s conclusions, his response is valuable and 
we hope that our exchange will spur further inquiry into the psychological mechanisms 
underlying support for the far right. We next respond to the points he raises regarding our model 
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specification, his alternative, and our conclusions about what to do next to resolve the 
disagreement empirically. 
I)  Claims about our model specification
Jost says we consider only two emotional reactions to the threat created by the Paris 
attacks (anger and fear) though he notes we also take into account enthusiasm. He writes: “They 
do not adjust for other emotions, only anger (except for a supplementary analysis in which they 
adjusted for enthusiasm, according to footnote 3), although the research literature in political 
psychology would suggest that several other emotions—including hope, empathy, guilt, disgust, 
happiness, and sadness.” 
Actually, we did measure the extent to which respondents felt anxious, frightened, 
scared, bitter, resentful, hateful, and angry after the Paris attacks. Our theory posits that there are 
three emotional dimensions, each with distinct political causes and consequences: anger, fear and 
enthusiasm. Previous work finds that anger, bitterness, hatred, and resentment together form one 
emotional appraisal dimension we label Anger, while fear, scared, and worried tap a second 
emotional appraisal dimension- Fear (Marcus et al., 2017; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019, pp. 20-21). 
Therefore, we built additive indexes of each emotional dimension based on these sets of items. 
Our results also hold when we control for a third emotional dimension- Enthusiasm- consisting 
of the emotional terms hopeful, proud, and enthusiastic. In sum, while we do not explicitly 
measure empathy, guilt, or disgust, our measures do include many of the items Jost mentions. 
We simply do not find all ten to each have independent effects in our model.  
II) Theoretical claims
 In the path model that anchors Jost’s analysis lie two theoretical claims that we find 
implausible. First, that anger is caused by fear. We hold that anger constitutes an independent 
emotional appraisal, triggered by different dimensions of threat. As with all survey indicators of 
psychological phenomena, these two emotions - fear and anger - are measured with error. We 
think it is likely that these errors are correlated because they are measured similarly and 
simultaneously, and because of the negative tone of both words.1 As a result, it is critical to 
1 But as we note in the article (footnote 11), the Variance Inflation Factor score (1.23) suggests 
that despite the correlation between fear and anger, multicollinearity is not an issue in our 
analysis
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control for each when examining the impact of the other. Only then will the independent effects 
of each emotional reaction on support for the FN become clear.
Second, Jost claims that authoritarianism, a long-term psychological disposition, 
mediates the effect of fear on vote choice and other political judgments. This also seems 
implausible because it is unlikely that a short term threat can substantially alter a long term 
psychological disposition. Instead, we suspect that the influence of authoritarianism is moderated 
by anger - the impact of the former increases as anger increases, but authoritarianism is relatively 
stable over time within the individual. 
We are aware of two major theories regarding the formation of emotions. The first is 
actually a collection of ideas often referred to as Cognitive Appraisal Theory (CAT). CAT posits 
that distinct emotional reactions are evoked by different appraisals of the environment by an 
individual. Specifically, several studies that employ the CAT framework argue that fear is 
evoked under uncertainty when facing threatening stimuli, when one perceives a threatening 
stimulus as unfamiliar, and when one lacks the means to effectively deal with the threat 
(Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Unlike fear, anger is evoked under conditions of 
certainty and specifically when one perceives goals intentionally obstructed but also possesses  
resources sufficient for dealing with the threat (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Lazarus, 1991; 
Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Consequentially, it seems to us less plausible that fear causes anger, 
but rather that the two are evoked by distinct appraisals of one’s environment. 
The second major group of theories on emotion formation comes from neuroscience. The 
insights from this literature also do not align well with the argument that fear causally precedes 
anger. Research shows that ascertaining whether the environment is certain and familiar or not is 
executed rapidly as a focused assessment of that feature of the environment (LeDoux, 1996; 
Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995; Adolphs, 2008). And, similarly identifying the 
presence of noxious threats, generating anger is also a rapid ongoing process with a near 
identical onset to fear (Maratos, Senior, Mogg, Bradley, & Rippon, 2012). These appraisals 
function in parallel and are generated before consciousness, subsequently entering into the 
complex cascade of neural processing that we might eventually become “aware of” in the sense 
that most would describe as consciousness (Brosch & Sander, 2013; Shenhav & Buckner, 2014). 
To summarize, neither of the two most prominent theoretical approaches on the formation of 
emotions render it likely that fear is a necessary causal antecedent for anger. 
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Then there is the treatment of authoritarianism as a consequence of fear triggered by the 
Paris attacks of November 13th, 2015. Extant literature offers different conceptualizations of 
authoritarianism, as either a ‘personality characteristic’, a ‘disposition’, a ‘political orientation’, 
or a ‘worldview.’ Regardless of these distinctions, scholarship sees authoritarianism as a 
relatively stable individual difference whose origins are either innate or grounded in some 
socialization process early in life (Feldman, 2003; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hetherington & 
Weiler, 2018; Stenner, 2005; Vasilopoulos & Lachat, 2018). On the other hand, emotions are 
swift contemporaneous appraisals of the external environment. Some of Jost’s work does indeed 
suggest that experiencing strong threat may affect long-term dispositions (e.g. Bonanno & Jost, 
2006). Thus, it is plausible that an external shock may have a lasting impact on a psychological 
disposition, though such an effect would be quite rare given authoritarianism’s stability. Jost’s 
argument implies that we should place instantaneous appraisals on the right hand side of an 
equation predicting authoritarianism, considering them causally prior to long-term 
psychological characteristics. Such a sequence is both theoretically unlikely and our data are not 
up to testing it, since we ask about authoritarianism and emotional reactions in the same survey 
and without any causal leverage in the design. So while we cannot rule out such an effect, we 
disagree with Jost about this interpretation. In order to resolve our disagreement, we need a 
different design, perhaps one that would include measures of authoritarianism both before and 
after the attacks. 
III: Empirical Claims 
Jost presents three sets of results a) a bivariate analysis that shows that fear is positively 
correlated with anger, right wing orientation, and authoritarianism b) the results of a model that 
includes only fear and not anger (which was generated on the basis of Table 1 in (Vasilopoulos 
et al., 2019) and c) a path model where fear predicts voting for the FN directly and indirectly 
through anger and authoritarianism. The fact that fear and anger run higher among authoritarians 
and conservatives in our data and in many other studies is not in dispute. Our focus is rather how, 
once evoked, these two negative emotions are differentially associated with the propensity to 
vote for the far right. 
As Jost notes, a model that omits anger shows a positive association between fear and 
voting for the FN. This leads him to the conclusion that “overall, the effect of fear on support for 
the Far Right is indeed positive, as previous work would suggest, rather than negative, as 
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suggested by Vasilopoulos et al. (2019)” (Jost, 2019, pp.  p. 3). We respectfully disagree with 
this conclusion. As fear and anger are correlated, a multivariate model (rather than bivariate 
correlations) is best suited to identify the affective mechanisms that motivate voters to support 
the far right. 
Even if we accept that fear causes anger as Jost {-Jost, 2019, #84109) suggests, his 
results illustrate that, unless it subsequently causes anger, unmediated fear is negatively 
associated with voting for the far right. The path values in his model indicate the direct effect of 
fear decreases support (-.06 in his model) and anger increases support (.23 in his model). It is 
not easy for us to reconcile these findings with a strong claim about the direct positive effect of 
fear on FN support. Anger is not simply “suppressing” the effect of fear if it is always strongly 
and positively associated with the outcome of interest, and if fear switches signs when we 
include both in the model. 
IV) Overall commentary
We recognize that testing causal theoretical assertions with observational data is fraught. 
This is especially true in a one-shot survey. Experiments can often help us, but only if the 
independent variable can be directly manipulated and randomly assigned to respondents, though 
of course no single experiment is conclusive. A large set of experimental studies has confirmed 
some of our claims. When emotions are manipulated directly and randomly assigned in an 
induction task, fear renders predispositions less consequential and increases attention to 
contemporary information, while anger boosts the impact of extant dispositions mobilizing 
individuals to political action (Banks, 2014; Banks & Valentino, 2012; Brader, 2005; Brader, 
2006; MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Stevens, 
2005; Valentino, Banks, Hutchings, & Davis, 2009; Lambert, Eadeh, & Hanson, 2019). Though 
the dependent variables in these experiments vary, the theoretical assertions specific to the roles 
of fear and anger are similar to those we report. More pertinent is a recent experiment by 
Valentino, Wayne, and Oceno (2018) that shows that anger boosted while fear decreased the 
impact of sexism on voting for Trump compared to a control group. That said, we need 
additional experimental evidence showing direct, mediating, and moderating effects of fear and 
anger on the propensity to vote for authoritarian leaders and parties. The combination of 
experiments, that allow better causal inference, with survey data, that offer high external validity, 
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can help us make move forward significantly in discovering the affective mechanisms that may 
move citizens to the arms of authoritarian leaders around the globe. 
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